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THE EQUAL PROTECTION JUGGERNAUT AND EXEMPTIONS
FROM OPEN-HOUSING LAWS
Berback v. Mangum, 297 N.Y.S. 2d 853 (Sup. Ct. 1969)
Petitioners, owners of a two-family owner-occupied dwelling, were
facing investigation by the New York Division of Human Rights for an
alleged discriminatory refusal to rent housing because of race or
color.' Petitioners sought to enjoin the investigation, arguing that the
anti-discrimination provisions of the New York open-housing law were
not applicable to their circumstances because the law explicitly ex-
empted two-family owner-occupied dwellings from its open-occupancy
provisions.' The Division of Human Rights argued that the exemption
was an unconstitutional affront to the fourteenth amendment.' The
trial court granted petitioners' request for an injunction; and held: the
exemption in the New York open-housing statute of two-family, owner-
occupied rental dwellings does not violate the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment.4
1. N.Y. ExEc. L-w § 295(6) (a) (McKinney Supp. 1970) provides that the
Division of Human Rights has the power to investigate complaints alleging unlawful
discrimination.
2. Id. § 296(5)(a) provides:
5a. It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for the owner, lessee,
sub-lessee, assignee, or managing agent of, or other person having the right to
sell, rent or lease a housing accommodation, constructed or to be constructed,
or any agent or employee thereof:
(1) To refuse to sell, rent, lease or otherwise to deny or to withhold from
any person or groups of persons such a housing accommodation because of the
race, creed, color, national origin or sex of such person or persons ....
(3) . . . The provisions of this paragraph (a) shall not apply (1) to the
rental of a housing accommodation in a building which contains housing
accommodations for not more than two families living independently of each
other if the owner or members of his family reside in one of such housing
accommodations ....
3. Berback v. Mangum, 59 Misc. 2d 41, 43, 297 N.Y.S.2d 853, 855 (Sup. Ct.
1969), a! 'd mem., 33 App. Div. 2d 655, 306 N.Y.S.2d 671 (1969).
4. Id. The Berback court also mentioned additional constitutional and statutory
provisions which could pose a challenge to the validity of the New York statutory
exemption-the thirteenth amendment (U.S. CONST.), the equal protection clause of
the N.Y. state constitution (N.Y. CONST. art. I § 11) and the 1866 Civil Rights Act
[codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970)], as construed by Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409 (1968). For a criticism of the Berback court's failure adequately to
discuss the possible applicability of these provisions, see A. KOLBEN, ENFORCING
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The prerogative of the owner to sell or rent his property to persons
of his choosing was largely unchallenged until the middle of the twen-
tieth century.5 Following World War II state legislatures began to cur-
tail the discretion of owners to discriminate on the basis of race or color
in the sale or rental of housing.6 New York joined the list of states
prohibiting race and color discrimination both in public housing and
in private sales or rentals in 196 1.7 The New York anti-discrimina-
tion law also granted the State Division of Human Rights administrative
jurisdiction "to eliminate and prevent discrimination . . . in housing
accommodations. . ."s However, as finally amended in 1963, the
state open-housing law contained an exemption of two-family, owner-
occupied residences from its anti-discrimination provisions.9
The validity of such state statutory exemptions can be tested con-
stitutionally under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 10 Under traditional analysis the equal protection clause
has involved a high degree of deference to the judgment of the state
legislature, requiring only a rational basis for the legislative classifica-
tion to withstand constitutional attack." But the Supreme Court has
OPEN-HOUSING: AN EVALUATION OF THE RECENT LEGISLATION AND DECISIONS 30
(1969).
5. REV. R. ROBERTS, THE EMERGENCE OF A CIVIL RIGHT: ANTI-DIScRIMINATION
LEGISLATION IN PRIVATE HOUSING IN THE U.S. 180-248 (1961).
6. Sloane, Housing Discrimination-The Response of the Law, 42 N.C. L. REV.
106, 123 (1963).
7. N.Y. ExEc. LAWv § 296 (McKinney Supp. 1970) (as amended on September 1,
1961, L. 1961, c.414, § 4). See also Governor's Memorandum on Bills Approved,
NEw YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL, 441-42 (1961). The constitutionality of the
New York proscription on discrimination in the sale or rental of housing was upheld in
State Comm'n for Human Rights v. Kennelly, 23 N.Y.2d 722, 244 N.E.2d 58 (1968).
8. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 290(3) (McKinney Supp. 1970).
9. Id. § 296(5) (a). See Governor's Memorandum on Bills Approved, NEw
YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL, 452 (1963).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV:
... nor shall any State . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), established the principle that the equal
protection clause and the fourteenth amendment as a whole apply to state action. A
state legislature's enactment of a statute clearly constitutes sufficient state action to
bring the statute within the purview of the fourteenth amendment, Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1888). For a discussion of erosion of the "state action" limi-
tation to the fourteenth amendment, see Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of
the "State Action" Limit on the Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 CoLUM. L. REv. 855
(1966). See also Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAMtV. L. REV.
1065, 1087-1107 (1969).
11. See Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947), where
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also developed a doctrine that certain legislative classifications are "sus-
pect" and will be subjected to more rigorous judicial scrutiny to see
if the equal protection clause has been violated by an invidious dis-
crimination. 2 Classifications based on race are especially "suspect."'13
State statutory classifications fraught with racial distinctions require a
"very heavy burden of justification.' 1 4  A "compelling governmental
interest" may be required to sustain validity of a state action which
promotes racial discrimination. 15
In the Berback situation it might be possible to argue that the exemp-
tion does not involve a racial classification subject to rigid scrutiny un-
der the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
exemption could be characterized as a simple distinction between own-
er-occupied duplexes and other types of housing. The New York Divi-
sion of Human Rights rejected this perspective and argued that the
exemption entailed a racial classification which affronted constitutional
doctrines prohibiting racial discrimination.' 6  The position of the Di-
vision of Human Rights seems a plausible depiction of the exemption.' 7
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld administration of a state system of licensing pilots
which guaranteed a tight family monopoly. The Court found the system valid under
the equal protection clause and rationally related to legitimate objects like the pro-
motion of high morale in the trade. In Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) the
Supreme Court sustained against an equal protection challenge a statute prohibiting
women other than the wife or daughter of a male bar-owner from obtaining a bar-
tender's license. See also constitutional authority, Kenneth Karst, who notes that the
Supreme Court's deference to the judgment of the state legislature in equal protection
cases has been strongest with regard to state economic regulation, Karst, Invidious
Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return of the Natural-Law-Due-Process For-
mula, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 716, 721-22 (1969).
12. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68
(1968); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). For a suggestion that strict
scrutiny of some classifications might stem from a desire to protect disadvantaged
minorities see Justice Stone's footnote in United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152-53, n.4 (1938). But see Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971) which dis-
tinguishes the Levy case and may herald a modification of the scope of strict
scrutiny.
13. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954). For a discussion of the special focus of the fourteenth amend-
ment on the race problem see The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36
(1873).
14. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967).
15. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944).
16. 59 Misc. 2d at 43, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 855.
17. Cf. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), where the Supreme Court
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In a law which sweepingly proscribes racial discrimination in sale or
rental of housing, the legislature carved out an exemption-a group
of people insulated from the requirements of the law.18  The Division
of Human Rights viewed this insulation as state-sanctioned discrimina-
tion. 19 The Berback court was thus squarely presented with the issue
of whether an exemption to an open-occupancy law can withstand
strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause.
However, the Berback court did not resolve this issue in deciding
the case. The Berback court upheld the constitutionality of the exemp-
tion based on the normal presumption of constitutionality 0 and on the
existence of a parallel exemption in the 1968 Federal Fair Housing
Act.21 However, these two reasons do not seem to be conclusive jus-
tifications for the validity of the exemption, if the exemption is to be
viewed as a racial classification. The Berback court placed reliance
on the presumption of constitutionality without discussing the possibil-
ity that the exemption could be viewed as embodying a racial classifi-
cation required to meet "a very heavy burden of justification."2 Simi-
larly inconclusive is the Berback court's argument that the existence of
a parallel provision in a federal statute provides a basis for upholding
the constitutional validity of a similar provision in a state statute. The
struck down a city charter amendment which posed an impediment to open-housing
laws.
18. Id.
19. 59 Misc. 2d at 43, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 855.
20. 59 Misc. 2d at 46, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 858. For a discussion of the presumption
of constitutionality see Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940) and McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
21. 59 Misc. 2d at 46, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 858. The provision in the Federal Fair
Housing Act which parallels the New York exemption is 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2)
(1970):
Exemptions
(2) rooms or units in dwellings containing living quarters occupied or in-
tended to be occupied by no more than four families living inde-
pendently of each other, if the owner actually maintains and occupies
one of such living quarters as his residence.
The Berback court did not raise the possibility that the New York open-housing law
might have been pre-empted by the federal Fair Housing Act of 1968. However,
preemption seems to be obviated by the federal act itself, which provides at 42 U.S.C.
§ 3615 (1970):
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to invalidate or limit any
law of a State or political subdivision of a State, or of any other jurisdiction
in which this subchapter shall be effective that grants, guarantees, or protects
the same rights as are granted by this subchapter.
See also Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 388 (1969).
22. See notes 14 & 15 supra.
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fourteenth amendment and its equal protection clause have been con-
strued as applicable only to state action, -  and the constitutional valid-
ity of the federal exemption itself has never been tested.24
Thus, it is necessary to probe beyond the Berback court's opinion
to test possible justifications of the exemption capable of withstanding
the attack of the Division of Human Rights that the exemption con-
stitutes an indefensible racial classification. Even if the exemption in-
volves a racial classification, it can still survive scrutiny under the
equal protection clause upon meeting a "very heavy burden of justifi-
cation"'  or upon showing a "compelling governmental interest.
26
There are three arguments that might reasonably be advanced to sup-
port the constitutionality of the exemption in the face of strict scrutiny.
The first argument involves the doctrine sometimes enunciated in equal
protection cases that a legislature is free to attack a problem in a
piecemeal fashion.27 The New York statutory exemption of two
family, owner-occupied housing could be argued as a practical legisla-
tive alternative to an unrestricted open-housing law.28  Rather than
an instrument of race discrimination, the exemption would be depicted
as a necessary compromise which enabled the state to undertake a
sweeping attack on racial discrimination after a battle for hous-
ing legislation which spanned two decades. 9 The second possible
argument to justify the exemption looks to the owner's property in-
23. See note 10 supra. But see Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), which
suggested that certain "concepts" of the equal protection clause might also be inherent
in the due process clause of the fifth amendment and hence applicable to federal
action. However, even Bolling did not hold that federal legislation is subject
to precisely the same scrutiny under the due process clause of the fifth amendment as
state legislation under the fourteenth amendment. The Bolling court noted that "'equal
protection of the laws' is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than 'due
process of law', and, therefore, we do not imply that the two are always interchange-
able phrases." 347 U.S. at 499.
24. For a suggestion that the federal exemption itself might be vulnerable to con-
stitutional attack see A. KOLBEN, ENFORCING OPEN-HOUSING: AN EVALUATION OF THE
RECENT LEGISLATION AND DECISIONs 30, 31 (1969).
25. See note 14 supra.
26. See note 15 supra.
27. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Railway Express Agency,
Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937).
28. See Robison, Fair Housing Legislation in the City and State of New York,
in THE POLrrIcs OF FAIR-HousIG LEGISLATION 27-64 (L. Eley & T. Casstevens eds.
1968) for a background on the difficulties in passing open-housing legislation in New
York.
29. Id.
Vol. 1972:145]
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terest as a principle legitimizing private discrimination. 0 The argu-
ment seems to assume an inviolate property right protected by a con-
stitutional provision. The most likely constitutional peg to defend this
right of property from state legislative regulation would be the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 3 1 The New York ex-
emption could be viewed as protecting the property rights also protected
by the fourteenth amendment. 2 Thus, the heavy burden of justifi-
cation or compelling interest required by strict scrutiny analysis
might be met. The third argument to justify the exemption involves
a "freedom of association" rationale.3 3 One commentator has suggested
that "freedom of association" could be argued as a justification for
discrimination in housing, especially as the size of the housing unit de-
clines with the parties consequently in closer proximity. 4 Constitu-
tional support for the rationale may be derived from Griswold v.
Connecticut, which suggested in a different context that a constitu-
tional right of free association and privacy could be derived from the
penumbra of the Bill of Rights and could be made applicable to the
states by incorporation into the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.35 As with the "property interest" argument, a constitu-
tional right of "free association" could be posited, and the New York
exemption could be argued as codifying this right to meet the heavy
burden of justification required under strict-scrutiny analysis.
However, each of these three arguments in support of the exemp-
tion could be met by strong counterarguments. The first hypothetical
argument, supporting the exemption as a justifiable and necessary prod-
uct of legislative compromise, can be met by the assertion that the ex-
emption is impermissible under any circumstance. The exemption might
be depicted as indefensible in light of the standards articulated in some
strict-scrutiny, equal-protection cases that deal with race discrumina-
30. Horowitz, Fourteenth Amendment Aspects of Racial Discrimination in "Pri-
vate" Housing, 52 CArw. L. REv. 1, 30 (1964).
31. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1:
. . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law. ....
32. It is possible that the Berback court was alluding to this notion of the owner's
property interest when it commented that "a man's home is his castle." 297
N.Y.S.2d at 860.
33. Horowitz, 52 CALm. L. REv. supra note 30 at 30.
34. Id.
35. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The Griswold decision struck down a Connecticut stat-
ute which prohibited counselling on the use of contraceptives. The decision featured
six separate opinions.
[Vol. 1972:145
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tion. In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority the Supreme Court
found an affront to the equal protection clause in the state action of
allowing a restaurant leasing public land to discriminate based on race.36
The Court found the arrangement unconstitutional because the state had
become a party to racial bias, placing its power and authority behind
private acts of race discrimination.37 In Reitman v. Mulkey the
Court struck down a state constitutional amendment which prohibited
state interference with the individual's discretion to sell or rent his
property.38 The Court found the constitutional provision invalid on
the grounds that the amendment embodied a legal authorization and
encouragement for those practicing racial discrimination, insulating
them from interference from official sources.39 Though the facts of
these cases might be distinguishable,4" the language of the Court places
the New York exemption in an awkward posture. The New York ex-
emption was being used by the petitioners in the Berback case as an
official authorization for their act of race discrimination, protecting the
petitioners from official sanctions.41 This depiction of the exemption
as constitutionally indefensible collides forcefully with the defense of
the exemption as a product of permissible legislative compromise. Yet
neither argument clearly overwhelms the other.
Such does not seem to be the case with the second hypothetical de-
fense of the exemption (protection of the owner's property rights)
and the third hypothetical defense of the exemption (protection of
the owner's freedom of association). These two defenses would probably
fail to meet the "heavy burden of justification" or "compelling inter-
est" required in a strict scrutiny case dealing with a racial classifi-
cation. - The "property interest" rationale for the exemption might be
36. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
37. Id. at 725.
38. 387 U.S. 369 (1967). The Reitman court quotes in its entirety the provision
under review-the initiative amendment to the California Constitution approved by the
voters of the state in 1964 as Proposition 14:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or
abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or
desires to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real property, to decline to
sell, lease or rent such property to such person or persons as he, in his ab-
solute discretion, chooses. 387 U.S. 369, 371 (1967).
39. Id. at 377.
40. Burton, a 6-to-3 decision, involved a lease of state property (365 U.S. 715).
Reitman, a 5-to-4 decision, involved a state constitutional amendment which had the
effect of abolishing all existent open-housing legislation (387 U.S. 369, 374).
41. 59 Misc. 2d at 42, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 854.
42. See notes 14 & 15 supra.
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deficient in meeting the requirements of strict scrutiny because of the
lack of an apparent necessity for the state to protect the "property
interest" only of duplex owners, rather than owners of other types
of housing. Furthermore, property interest arguments have not proved
very effective in the federal courts in countering charges of ra-
cial discrimination. 43  Looking to the New York courts, one finds that
they have favored the principle that in any conflict between human
rights and property rights protection of human rights, such as free-
dom from discrimination, will prevail.4 4  Likewise, the freedom-of-
association argument for the exemption seems insufficient to meet the
requirements of strict scrutiny. First, the free-association argument
would have to stretch the existing penumbra doctrine of Griswold v.
Connecticut and might well be vulnerable to the charge of deriving a
penumbra from a penumbra." Secondly, it is difficult to see how the
"heavy burden of justification" or "compelling interest" requirements
could be met by the free-associaton argument, since the state would
have to justify protection of the free-association of the duplex-dweller
because of his proximity to his neighbors but not to the dweller of a
five-room apartment who shares a common bathing facility with a ten-
ant of another race. Thus, the probable inadequacy of the property-
interest and the free-association arguments appears to leave only one
justification of the exemption tenable enough to withstand strict scru-
tiny.
The strongest argument in support of the exemption seems to be that
the exemption is the product of reasonable legislative compromise
whereby the legislature chose to attack only part of the problem of dis-
crimination in housing.46 As was discussed earlier, this argument in
support of the exemption can be met by the equally cogent counter-
argument that the exemption is an impermissible state protection and
encouragement of race discrimination. The clash between these two
perspectives is illustrative of the great dilemma facing the courts in ap-
plying strict scrutiny analysis to contemporary problems. In the past
43. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) and Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) where property interest arguments were rejected.
44. State Comm'n for Human Rights v. Kennelly, 30 App. Div. 2d 310, 314, 291
N.Y.S.2d 686, 691 (Sup. Ct. 1968), aff d, 23 N.Y.2d 722, 244 N.E.2d 58, 296 N.Y.S.2d
367 (1968).
45. For the explication of the "penumbra" doctrine see Justice Douglas' opinion
in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
46. See notes 27-29 supra.
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the breakthrough doctrine of Brown v. Board of Education unleashed
an equal protection juggernaut which sought to sweep away the blatant
forms of state-sanctioned race discrimination.4 7  Today the easy cases
have all been decided, and the courts face the far more difficult task of
determining how far we will extend the equal protection clause as a
check on state legislative action. On the one hand, it is quite possible
to see the crucial need to maintain maximum legislative flexibility in
attacking the problem of racial discrimination in America. This view
was aptly articulated by the late Justice Harlan in his dissent in Reitman
v. Mulkey:
"More fundamentally, the doctrine underlying this decision may
hamper, if not preclude, attempts to deal with the delicate and trouble-
some problems of race relations through the legislative process. The
lines that have been and must be drawn in this area, fraught as it is
with human sensibilities and frailties of whatever race or creed, are
difficult ones. The drawing of them requires understanding, patience
and compromise, and is best done by legislatures rather than by
courts. When legislation in this field is unsuccessful there should be
wide opportunities for legislative amendment, as well as for change
through such processes as the popular initiative and referendum. This
decision, I fear, may inhibit such flexibility .... ,,4s
This perspective would counsel caution in striking down an exemption
to an open-housing law, lest the state legislature be prevented from
making any attack at all on the problem. On the other hand, it could
be said that the problem of discrimination in housing which plagues
this country would be exacerbated by condoning state legislation
which protects and encourages race discrimination.49 This perspective
would depict exemptions to open-housing laws as constitutionally repug-
nant in creating privileged pockets of state-sanctioned race discrimina-
47. See, e.g., Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877
(1955) (striking down segregation on beaches); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903
(1956) (striking down segregation on buses); New Orleans City Park Imp. Ass'n v.
Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (striking down segregation of parks).
48. 387 U.S. at 369, 395-96.
49. See the report of the Kerner Commission on civil disorders, which stated:
"America is divided into two societies, black and white, separate and unequal" NA-
TIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT 1 (1968). The acute
shortage of minority housing is a critical domestic problem with at least one out of
eight families in substandard housing. I REPORT OF PRESamxIAL COMM. ON URBAN
HOUSING, TEcHNicA. STuiEs 9 (1967). For a discussion of the subtle means used
to maintain segregated housing patterns see Justice Douglas' concurrence in Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 391 (1967).
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Washington University Open Scholarship
154 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1972:145
tion. There is obviously no easy resolution of these two conflicting
views. The exemption in the New York law and similar exemptions
in other state laws will probably be a continuing source of litigation
until the constitutionally permissible scope of exemptions to open-hous-
ing laws is finally determined.50
50. See the suggestion of one civil rights attorney that the N.Y. exemption is in
constitutional jeopardy in A. KOLBEN, ENFORCING OPEN-HouSING: AN EVALUATION OF
THE RECENT LEGISLATION AND DECISIONS 30 (1969). But see Richards v. Mangum,
60 Misc. 2d 410, 303 N.Y.S.2d 321 (Sup. Ct. 1969) where the New York Division of
Human Rights undertook a second abortive attack on the exemption.
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